However, reinforcing the national security forces alone does not seem feasible due to their current weaknesses and the acknowledged dysfunction within the Haitian National Police
« The best way to predict the future is to create it. »
— Abraham Lincoln
In June 2024, I cautioned that Haiti was on the verge of total collapse. Based on the current political and security developments, I believe we have now reached that critical point. Unfortunately, there are only a few options left to address this situation: i) reinforcing the national security forces, which include the police forces (PNH) and the army (FAd’H), ii) supporting the ongoing Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) led by Kenya, or iii) deploying a full-fledged United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operation (PKO).
However, reinforcing the national security forces alone does not seem feasible due to their current weaknesses and the acknowledged dysfunction, notably within the Haitian National Police (PNH). Additionally, there are reported tensions between the police commander-in-chief, Rameau Normil, and Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé. Strengthening the MSSM also appears unrealistic, as it has not been particularly successful in supporting police forces since its authorization in October 2023. This leaves the option of deploying a full-fledged UN peacekeeping operation, which has now been recognized as necessary even by human rights activists who were previously opposed to such intervention. While this situation is far from ideal—especially considering past experiences with UN missions in Haiti—it may be the least problematic solution available.
Stabilizing the security environment is crucial for ensuring the safe return of displaced persons, and approximately 500,000 Haitians currently in the U.S. who will lose their Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in August 2025. It is furthermore essential to create a conducive environment to address the socio-economic challenges that have emerged following six years of recession and to restore constitutional normalcy, which includes holding elections.
To ensure that international efforts are cost-effective and results-oriented this time, a new approach to governance must be adopted to properly address the complex nature of the crisis.
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The Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) is at a crossroads: “To be or not to be”.
In April 2024, a presidential council composed of nine members was established following the signing of the April 3rd agreement among various political factions. These factions include EDE/RED/Compromis Historique (which incorporates Claude Joseph’s Jovenelists), Lavalas, Pitit Dessalin, certain segments of the private sector, signatories of the December 21 agreement, the January 30 collective (which includes PHTK, the former presidential party) and the Montana Group. Additionally, representatives from certain religious organizations, as well as civil society organizations primarily aligned with the December 21 agreement are involved in the council.
The April 3rd agreement was brokered by CARICOM, with temporary assistance from Jonathan Powell, the former Chief of Staff to Tony Blair and CEO of Inter Mediate, as well as Patrick Gaspard, now a distinguished fellow at the Center for American Progress, who previously served as the director of the White House Office of Political Affairs under President Obama. Mr. Gaspard liaised with some groups within the U.S.-based Haitian diaspora. The Apostolic Nuncio in Port-au-Prince provided political stakeholders with facilities at his residence in his absence.
Although the agreement aimed to be inclusive, the Montana Group, Lavalas, and the January 30 collective viewed certain other sectors as illegitimate. They believed these groups were being utilized by the so-called international community as a political counterweight against them, especially since they did not support former Prime Minister Ariel Henry.
Their reading led to criticisms at the UN Security Council (UNSC) from China and Russia, resulting in their opposition to the transformation of the MSSM into a UN peacekeeping operation. They were unwilling to support this mission during a time of heightened tensions with the Biden administration over Ukraine and Taiwan, ultimately fearing the establishment of a U.S. « proxy » in the Caribbean in the aftermath of the elections.
Ten months after its formation, almost all signatories of the April 3rd agreement—including Fanmi Lavalas, the January 30 Collective, EDE/RED/Compromis Historique, and key signatories of the December 21 agreement such as the SDP and representatives from the private sector—have expressed political dissatisfaction with the current Transitional Presidential Council (TPC). Fritz Alphonse Jean, who represents the Montana Group at the TPC, is presently embroiled in ongoing tensions with the Bureau de Suivi de l’Accord (BSA), a follow-up committee within the Montana Group. He has been the head of the TPC since March 7, following Leslie Voltaire, the Lavalas representative – in keeping with the rotating presidency established by the council which instates a new member of the council as president every six months.
This discontent primarily arises from the government’s failure to address the security, humanitarian, and economic crisis, as well as its plans to hold a referendum and general elections without observing adequate security assessments or national consultations with the various sectors the TPC members are supposed to represent.
Moreover, three voting members of the TPC have been the object of a corruption scandal. While the Port-au-Prince Court of Appeal recently ruled that acting council members could not be summoned by a regular court due to their presidential status, this case has cast a shadow over the TPC and all its subsequent decisions, particularly regarding its political appointments.
The agreement reached on April 3, 2024, serves as the political foundation for the current transition; however, it has not been published in the official Monitor. Furthermore, the political roadmap outlining the transition to elected authorities in February 2026 has yet to be fully implemented. For example, the Oversight Committee for Government Actions (OCAG), as proposed in the agreement, has not been established – inciting criticism regarding the TPC’s transparency and legitimacy.
The Unattainable Referendum and Elections
The TPC has instructed the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to accelerate the electoral process, and 55 million USD have been allocated to a dedicated UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) managed Basket Fund according to the Prime Minister. During his visit to France at the end of January / early February 2025, Leslie Voltaire, the President of the TPC at the time, announced that a referendum would be held on May 11, 2025, followed by general elections scheduled for mid-November 2025. Nonetheless, the official election calendar from the CEP, which has been reportedly sent to the TPC, has yet to be published.
As of February 2025, the Office of National Identification (ONI) reported that 6,048 million Haitian citizens have registered. This includes 93,062 registrations from the Caribbean region and 26,824 from the American region. However, an official audit to verify the registration data and ensure that the ID registry has been properly maintained has not been conducted. This audit was not performed during Ariel Henry’s tenure as Prime Minister, although it was requested by political actors, particularly those who signed the 11 September agreement. There were indeed serious allegations regarding Jovenel Moïse’s push for a constitutional referendum, specifically that the ID database had been artificially inflated with hundreds of thousands of names. This manipulation aimed to create a critical mass of eligible voters to lend credibility to the referendum already scheduled for 2021.
Current sources within the CEP reported that, as of the end of February, only 5.4 million ID cards have been distributed to registered citizens to date, resulting in a discrepancy of 650,000 between the number of registered individuals (6.048 million) and the number of ID cards delivered. According to ONI procedures, registrations are valid only if beneficiaries personally collect their ID cards and are authenticated using their previously registered biometric data. Therefore, the number of valid registered citizens should match the number of ID cards distributed. The figure of 6.048 million likely represents the number of registered individuals, some of whom are awaiting their identity cards. However, it is important to note that only those who are properly registered and can present an identity card will be eligible to vote.
However, sources within ONI have indicated that ONI standard procedures were not followed at the end of Jovenel Moïse’s presidency. There were several instances of individuals registering multiple times, notably because they had not yet received their ID cards. It remains unclear whether duplicates were properly removed. Additionally, ONI sources reported that unauthorized third parties may have been allowed to collect ID cards on behalf of others.
Given the gravity of these allegations, it is crucial to address this issue to maintain the integrity of the electoral process. The ID database should be audited to ensure the accuracy of the voter registry, which is sourced from the database.
This critical aspect of the process is time-consuming, making it technically impossible to conduct the referendum in the coming months, especially not in May, as previously announced by the TPC. It will take several weeks to perform a proper audit. Once this is complete, logistic challenges regarding ID card distributions will need to be addressed.
Another concern is the international technical assistance funded by USAID to the CEP, which may be halted due to the Trump administration’s decision to cut most of the USAID funding. For instance, according to the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), an implementing partner of USAID, supported the CEP with its referendum decree and other related matters in December 2024.
If the CEP has secured funding from the government to hold the referendum announced by Voltaire for May 11 and the general elections later this year, it must take several important steps. These include publishing the official timeline, issuing the referendum decree, finalizing the mapping of voting centers, and releasing a provisional electoral list well in advance of the official voting day. Doing so will allow for legal challenges to the electoral list and provide voters with the opportunity to identify their voting centers or make changes, like what was done during the previous electoral cycle.
The CEP also needs to recruit and train electoral personnel, as well as procure and distribute the necessary materials to the voting centers. This process requires a significant amount of time and is likely to face delays due to ongoing insecurity and an insufficient number of available security forces, including those from the MSSM.
In interviews with French media on January 29, 2025, Voltaire suggested that the referendum could take place in 8 of the country’s 10 departments. He assured displaced voters in the capital (Ouest Department) and Artibonite—two regions primarily affected by gang violence—would be able to vote in secure locations. However, this plan appears unrealistic given the large number of displaced persons, which has reached approximately one (1) million according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the limited availability of security personnel. It is important to note that during previous electoral cycles in 2005/06, 2010, and 2015/16, MINUSTAH provided security for the transportation of electoral materials and for voting centers in sensitive areas.
During a recent meeting with the CEP, Prime Minister Fils-Aimé emphasized that ensuring the security of the electoral process should be a top priority. This stance stands in contrast to Voltaire’s statement on the matter. However, it implies that there will be no elections until minimum conditions are met. Some political actors view this as a delaying tactic, similar to the situation during Ariel Henry’s tenure, which could lead to an indefinite transitional period. In this presumed scenario, the international community may be blamed for failing to provide adequate assistance to Haiti.
The BINUH’s latest quarterly report, presented to the UN Security Council in January 2025, reported that, on November 13, BINUH and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) “provided logistical support for the launch of the National Conference (on Électoral Reforms). From November 13 to 19, the working group on constitutional review engaged with representatives from the private sector, trade and labor unions, and civil society organizations to gather perspectives on governance, economic reforms, workers’ rights, social cohesion, and democratic values”.
While this launch received some support from the UN, prominent political figures from various parties and civil society representatives, including those associated with the TPC, still claimed that they were unaware of the discussions and outcomes of these meetings. The human rights group RNDDH reported that no one has been able to access any draft documents which were said to have been discussed locally. The Lavalas party, represented by Voltaire at the TPC, has rejected the idea of holding a referendum and general elections this year, citing the ongoing security situation.
A document from the Steering Committee of the National Conference has been circulating since mid-March. It outlines workshops that took place in Brazil, Canada, France, the United States (specifically in Miami and New York), and the Dominican Republic. However, several sectors that are meant to be represented at the TPC have confirmed that they were not included in the consultation process. More concerning for these sectors is that some conclusions from these workshops reflect key elements of Jovenel Moïse’s draft constitution of 2021, such as the proposal for a single head of executive power.
There is now a clear discord with the TPC regarding how to implement constitutional reform, despite the April 3 agreement which was intended to foster a consensus on this matter.
There are also ongoing concerns regarding the CEP established in December 2024, which BINUH views as a sign of political progress in its latest quarterly report. However, many political stakeholders are skeptical about the CEP’s potential for success, especially given the costs already incurred, particularly for workshops that have been deemed ineffective, and the announcement to hire electoral staff for the upcoming referendum. Critics argue that the various sectors represented on the CEP did not appoint influential individuals capable of effectively leading the electoral process and anticipate that the current TPC will soon disband or undergo a reshuffle. Tensions prevail within the human rights and women’s sectors over the selection of their respective representatives.
The European Commission for Democracy through Law, commonly known as the Venice Commission, is associated with the Council of Europe. It was consulted by the Organization of American States (OAS) regarding the referendum and the electoral process, and I participated in one of their meetings last year. The Venice Commission has expressed clear concerns about the feasibility of conducting a constitutional referendum in the current political and security environment. These concerns have been reiterated during UNSC meetings.
On March 17, the president of the CEP, Patrick Saint-Hilaire, acknowledged that it will not be possible to hold the referendum in May, which effectively jeopardizes the general elections scheduled for later this year. It is becoming increasingly evident that the TPC will be unable to implement the April 3 agreement. According to this agreement, the TPC’s mandate is set to expire on February 7, 2026, regardless of whether elections are held (Art. 13).
The Need to Rethink Governance
Most sectors represented at the TPC—including the January 30 Collective, key segments of the December 21 Agreement, EDE/RED/Compromis Historique, the Montana Group, and Lavalas—are already advocating for a new system of governance. So far, the proposed alternatives include:
- A dual head-executive system, featuring a judge from the Court of Cassation as President, inspired by the provisions of the original unamended version of the 1987 Constitution.
- A presidential council composed of three members.
- A presidential council of three members, with a judge from the Court of Cassation serving as President.
- Reducing the current TPC to four voting members, excluding the three who have been the object of a corruption scandal, with a judge from the Court of Cassation as President.
The proposal to appoint a judge as the transitional President has been put forward by notable figures including Steven Benoit, Camille Leblanc, Jacky Lumarque, Samuel Madistin, and the Collectives of 4 December and January 30 (which includes the PHTK party, without the OPL). Other supporters of this proposal include the EDE party and primarily the SDP, part of the December 21 Agreement. On the other hand, Lavalas has consistently advocated for a government of salvation composed of credible individuals who are dedicated to combating exclusion and corruption and who share a vision for a new mode of governance. The Montana Group supports the idea of a three-member presidential council to lead a technical government; however, some members of the group associated with Civil Society are reportedly open to the possibility of a judge from the Court of Cassation serving as the President of the transition.
There is thus potential for a political agreement and effective governance to emerge soon, given the urgency of the situation. A solid governance framework is essential for combating corruption, effectively collecting and allocating taxes, reestablishing a functional and independent judiciary, ending impunity, and ensuring proper vetting of both the police and armed forces (FAd’H) in Haiti.
In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that Haiti is losing a significant amount of revenue at its customs borders. National and international economists have estimated that these losses reached as much as 1 billion USD each year, with approximately $600 million at the port and airport levels and $400 million from customs at the border with the Dominican Republic. With such substantial financial resources, Haiti could potentially rebuild and thrive, especially with the support of its diaspora, whose remittances account for 27% of the country’s GDP (in 2024) and are crucial in preventing total economic collapse.
The Capital is Poised to Fall
The situation in Haiti has significantly deteriorated since the establishment of the TPC. Recent mass killings and severe human rights violations, particularly in Wharf Jeremie, Kenscoff, and Chateaublond, along with repeated attacks in and around the capital, have intensified the crisis. The international airport in the capital has been closed since November 11, 2024, with no indication of when it might reopen, making it nearly impossible to leave the city. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has extended its ban on U.S. flights to Port-au-Prince until Sept. 8, 2025.
Access from the South, impacted by an earthquake in 2021, to the North—including the road to the Côte des Arcadins tourist resorts—and to the main border crossing into the Dominican Republic is nearly completely blocked. This situation severely restricts humanitarian access to the southern departments, including maritime routes, as gangs operate around the ports.
Recent events in Kenscoff are particularly alarming, as they pose a direct threat to Petion-Ville, one of the few suburbs of the capital that has been relatively spared, exposing it to potential attacks from both the North and the South, complicating evacuation efforts. Gang activity has significantly expanded, now affecting up to 85% of the capital. Initially, the gangs targeted police stations and jails, but they have recently begun to attack hospitals and several media outlets, demonstrating their intent to systematically eliminate social infrastructure.
According to the World Food Programme (WFP), two million people are now facing emergency levels of food insecurity.
The Haitian National Police (PNH), supported by the armed forces, are responsible for containing gang activity. Voltaire has estimated that the total strength of these forces is around 8,000 personnel, while the armed forces comprise only 1,000. This brings the combined total to 9,000, which falls significantly short of the UN’s official estimate of 11,286 police personnel.
Human rights activists argue that the actual number of operational officers may be even lower, around 6,000. Additionally, the Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) is currently only comprised of 1,000 officers since the beginning of their deployment, which is well below the 2,500 personnel authorized by the UN Security Council in October 2023.
The PNH is marked by fragmentation and politicization, resulting in inadequate control over its operations. This fragmentation is particularly evident in the challenges faced in managing the security situation in Kenscoff. Such difficulties likely account for the criticisms directed at the PNH, including recent statements from the Prime Minister, as well as the police force’s inability to provide accurate personnel statistics. Furthermore, allegations have been ongoing concerning some police officers’ collaboration with gangs. If these issues are not effectively addressed, they could undermine any strategies developed by the UNSC aimed at supporting, training, and strengthening the police force’s fight against gangs.
This situation highlights a broader challenge faced by the international community in Haiti and other conflict zones, such as Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, billions—possibly trillions—of dollars were invested until the fall of Kabul in mid-August 2021; however, effective and resilient security forces were never established to ensure safety on the ground. The key lesson from that experience is that the international community, including the UN and donor countries, will ultimately fail if good governance is not prioritized and treated as a prerequisite for success.
The MSSM: The Chronicles of an Announced Failure
In response to a request from the UNSC in October 2024 regarding the potential transformation of the MSS into a PKO, UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated that the necessary conditions for such a mission are currently not met, as there is no peace to maintain. This perspective aligns with China’s viewpoint expressed during previous UNSC meetings. Instead, Guterres recommends strengthening the Kenya-led MSSM by increasing its personnel and strengthening its rules of engagement. Besides, he suggests that the mandate of the current UN mission be revised to ensure that it provides structural and logistical support to the MSSM through the existing UN peacekeeping budget.
This proposal unfortunately does not address key issues and will essentially maintain the existing structure in Haiti. The MSSM remains a non-UN mission led by Kenya, which has struggled to garner support from other countries. Notably, several nations, particularly in Latin America, have privately expressed discomfort with a mission perceived to be directed from Washington and led by Kenya, a country facing accusations of human rights violations at home by its police forces. This concern may explain Benin’s hesitation to deploy its troops, as they argued that the MSSM should be led by a military commander rather than a police commander, considering the military nature of the expected operations against the gangs. This clarifies why countries in the Americas have advocated for transforming this mission into a full-fledged UN PKO.
Achieving security stability in Haiti requires sufficient troop deployment—not just through mobile rapid response forces—but also through static forces to prevent a power vacuum that could be quickly filled by gangs. Understandably, few countries are eager to join a force tasked with confronting gangs on the front lines, considering their heavy weaponry, mobility, and recruitment of adolescents and children.
More importantly, the UN Secretary-General’s proposed approach is likely to fail unless the UN can effectively cut off funding and supplies to the gangs. It is essential to implement an effective arms embargo and strong sanctions to achieve this objective. So far, only seven individuals have been sanctioned, including six gang leaders who are not affected by international sanctions because they do not have known assets outside of the country. Additionally, UN sanctions will remain ineffective if they are not enforced at the national level. This requires the reestablishment of a penal chain, which includes a fully functioning and independent judicial system.
The UN’s Other Option: A Peacekeeping Operation?
The UN has correctly characterized the crisis in Haiti as multidimensional, which then logically requires a comprehensive response. In this context, a PKO is a more suitable option than the MSSM. Firstly, it would enhance coordination within the mission under the UN framework, facilitating the scaling up of operations beyond the current troop count of 2,500. Secondly, it would more effectively address the humanitarian and socio-economic aspects of the crisis, which have significantly worsened after six years of recession (with an average decline of 2.3% each year).
Although past UN peacekeeping operations on the island, particularly the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), had their shortcomings, the security situation during its deployment was significantly more stable than it is today. It is now widely acknowledged that since the departure of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) in 2017, the last UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, now known as DPO) in Haiti, security has continued to deteriorate.
This solution may not be perfect; however, it is advocated by some segments of civil society, that were previously reluctant to accept it, and human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch, that argues that it is the only viable option remaining to restore security. Since the end of the Cold War, two-thirds—specifically, eleven out of sixteen—UN peacekeeping operations have successfully concluded and withdrawn. Yet, important lessons must be learned from past UN missions in Haiti, especially since many critics have pointed out that these missions failed to establish resilient institutions, such as effective police forces and an independent judiciary. This is particularly concerning, given that two missions—MIPONUH and MINUJUSTH—were specifically tasked in Haiti with these objectives.
Despite the billions of dollars invested by donor countries in Haiti for reconstruction following the 2010 earthquake, relatively few resources have effectively benefited the nation and its people. This has led to a lack of sustainable projects and institutions. Haiti currently does not have a permanent electoral council, a constitutional court, functional penitentiaries, or adequate infrastructure. Basic services such as reliable sewage systems, recycling facilities, and energy plants capable of providing 24-hour electricity are sorely lacking, despite pledges made by former President Jovenel Moise. Many roads and bridges are in disrepair, and public services are virtually nonexistent. In the capital, children are unable to attend school due to insecurity. Furthermore, Haiti lacks a reliable cadaster and civil registry, raising concerns about its ability to attract foreign investors without an effective archival system in place.
Strengthening the MSSM and establishing clear rules of engagement, as proposed by the UN Secretary-General, could nevertheless facilitate a short-term transition to a UN PKO. This transition would allow the MSSM to conduct targeted operations aimed at combating gangs, reopening key access roads, and restoring operations at the international airport. The UN has precedents for such authorized targeted interventions, including the EU-led Artemis Operation in 2002 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I supported when I worked with MONUC, and the intervention in Haiti in 2004, which laid the groundwork for MINUSTAH. However, this option requires a comprehensive reevaluation of the current leadership within the MSSM, as well as an assessment of existing operational concepts and collaboration with national security forces. To support this initiative, the UNSC should deploy an evaluation mission to Haiti to assess the urgent situation on the ground and engage with a diverse range of political and civil society stakeholders.
UN Security Council Dynamics: Seeking a Win-Win Solution
China and Russia should contemplate supporting a UN PKO in Haiti. This consideration arises particularly because UN Secretary-General António Guterres has suggested using the UN peacekeeping budget to reinforce the existing MSSM. If the UNSC approves this plan, it would mean that China and Russia would be financially contributing to the proposed mission, as part of the funding will come from assessed contributions by UN member States.
Furthermore, there is significant backing from Latin American countries for a UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti, making it difficult for China to dismiss the Latin American nations’ interest in addressing the instability in Haiti. As one of Haiti’s key trading partners, China cannot overlook the impact that unrest in Haiti has on the wider region, especially given its goal to strengthen alliances at Taiwan’s expense.
On November 13, the Organization of American States (OAS) unanimously passed a resolution in support of the Haitian government’s request for a UN PKO. This action was endorsed by the Vatican. During the XXIXth Ibero-American Summit held in Ecuador in November 2024, countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, and Venezuela—nations that do not align with Washington—expressed their support for transitioning from the MSSM to a UN PKO.
Additionally, the instability in Haiti is increasingly seen as a threat to regional peace and stability. This concern is shared by the Dominican Republic and other countries that are worried about Haitian migration, drug cartels and arms trafficking organizations. Recently, Colombian President Gustavo Petro stated that Haitian territory has been utilized by Colombian drug cartels and armed groups from Catatumbo, a troubled region in the northeast of Colombia near the border with Venezuela. These groups use Haiti as a route for trafficking drugs to Miami. Furthermore, authorities in the Dominican Republic announced on March 4th, the seizure of 36,000 cartridges, 23 firearms, and over two dozen rifle and pistol magazines from a shipment intended for Haiti originating in Miami.
On the other hand, Russia is likely to be less opposed to a UN PKO in Haiti. Instead, it is concentrating on strengthening its relations with the United States to secure a favorable peace deal regarding Ukraine. This change may lead China to be cautious about isolating itself, as it seeks to maintain its partnership with Moscow.
From the European perspective, France has publicly advocated for a UN PKO in Haiti. It plans to seek support from the European Union and other UNSC members for this operation, with the United Kingdom expressing its support as well.
The Trump administration has strong incentives to stabilize Haiti, particularly after the decision to end the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program in August 2025, which affects approximately 500,000 Haitians currently living in the United States. President Trump was elected in part due to his practical approach to illegal immigration and his commitment to combating drug trafficking. This context may lead him and his U.S. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, to address the urgent situation in Haiti.
As previously noted, the current MSSM option is inadequate because its existing version has restricted scalability—a concern that Rubio raised during his confirmation speech before the U.S. Senate in January.
Reports have emerged regarding U.S. lobbying efforts involving private security firms; however, past interventions of this kind, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, have often failed and undermined the diplomatic efforts of the U.S. State Department. President Trump and Marco Rubio, who maintain close ties to Florida, may naturally be concerned about the political and security chaos that such an option could create, potentially leading to an increase in illegal immigration on Florida’s shores. This situation could be felt during the midterm elections.
Last but not least, Haiti presents a unique opportunity for members of the UNSC to promote a collaborative multilateral approach to conflict resolution. By utilizing the lessons learned from this situation, a successful outcome can emerge that benefits the future of the UN. Let’s seize this chance before it is lost for good.
Cover : A man standing in a street with a tire being set on fire. Photo : Nations Unis
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