The reasons behind the failure of Kenya’s mission in Haiti

AyiboPost reviews the outcome of an expensive mission that ultimately made little difference in Haiti’s battle against insecurity

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The Kenyan force is set to be integrated into a new structure called the Gang Repression Force (FRG), authorized in September under a United Nations resolution, according to a senior mission official contacted by AyiboPost.

The FRG replaces the Multinational Security Support Mission (MMAS), which arrived in the country in June 2024 with an initial one-year mandate.

Led by Kenya, the MMAS officially ended its mission in October. Its stated goal was to support the Haitian National Police (PNH) in its fight against heavily armed gangs and to protect key national infrastructure.

More than a year later, the underfunded and poorly equipped mission had failed to retake a single major territory or key road from the gangs. Instead, those groups expanded their control over Port-au-Prince and several other regions of the country.

Throughout its mandate, the MMAS received only 18 percent of the $600 million allocated for its annual budget—funding that was supposed to come from voluntary contributions by UN member states.

And out of the 2,500 personnel expected to join, only about 1,000 actually deployed.

Observers and civil society leaders interviewed by AyiboPost described the MMAS as ineffective, given its failure to contain the violence. Haitian and UN officials, however, claim that its replacement by the FRG will help address the logistical and financial constraints that undermined the earlier mission.

Since 2023, AyiboPost has followed closely the evolution of the MMAS—from its inception to its operations on the ground. This report recounts, in detail, the key moments that marked the mission’s troubled presence in Haiti.

The Haitian Government’s Request

Haiti’s political and security crisis worsened following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021.

In an October 2022 letter, then–Prime Minister Ariel Henry formally asked the United Nations for technical assistance and for the deployment of an international specialized force to help the Haitian National Police fight armed gangs.

That request found support from both CARICOM and UN Secretary-General António Guterres. In a letter dated eight days later—and in a subsequent report published in April 2023—Guterres urged the Security Council to take urgent action on Haiti.

Three months later, Kenya, under President William Ruto, expressed its willingness to lead such an intervention. The United Nations approved the decision through a resolution adopted in October 2023.

A Controversial Decision in Kenya

Kenya’s decision to lead the mission sparked strong opposition at home.

In an interview with AyiboPost, Ekuru Aukot, a politician who helped draft Kenya’s 2010 constitution, said the decision to send police officers to Haiti violated both the constitution and Kenya’s national police laws.

Aukot’s political party, Thirdway Alliance, along with other civil society groups, filed a petition to block the deployment, calling it unconstitutional and a violation of national sovereignty.

The petition was submitted to Kenya’s High Court, which suspended the deployment in October 2023.

Ekuru Aukot. Photo | Evans Habil, 2020

In January 2024, the court ruled that sending troops to Haiti was indeed illegal and unconstitutional.

Nevertheless, in March 2024, the Kenyan government announced its readiness to proceed after signing a memorandum of understanding with Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who was visiting Nairobi at the time.

That agreement was never made public. Many observers saw the move as a way to circumvent the court’s decision.

“This mission represents hope for humanity—for a people who no longer see how they’ll survive tomorrow,” Ariel Henry said during the signing.

While some Kenyans condemned the deployment, others, such as journalist Peter Wakaba—an activist in Nairobi for more than a decade—told AyiboPost that Kenya’s involvement represented a chance to extend solidarity beyond its borders.

The Arrival of the First Kenyan Troops

On June 25, 2024, the first Kenyan contingent—about 300 officers—landed at Toussaint Louverture International Airport, greeted by a small crowd, including journalists.

Among those present—some displaced by gang violence—reactions were divided between hope and skepticism.

These troops arrived under difficult circumstances for both countries.

In Port-au-Prince, the Viv Ansanm gang coalition had gone on the offensive in February 2024, orchestrating mass prison breaks at two major facilities.

Human rights groups reported that at least 5,000 inmates, including dangerous offenders, escaped.

The attacks effectively cut Port-au-Prince off from the rest of the country and the world. The capital’s main airport and seaport were both shut down after gang assaults demanding Ariel Henry’s resignation.

Trapped in Nairobi and abandoned by international allies, the prime minister could not return to Haiti—or even land in the Dominican Republic.

He eventually ended up in Puerto Rico, where he announced his resignation on March 24 before flying to the United States.

The airport, briefly seized by gangs, was retaken by the Haitian police before the Kenyan forces arrived. The Kenyans merely reinforced security there—contrary to later claims by a senior mission official who told AyiboPost that his team had recaptured it.

Meanwhile, in Kenya, the same day the officers landed in Haiti, their colleagues were battling thousands of young protesters in the streets.

Demonstrators had been protesting for more than two weeks against President William Ruto’s finance bill, demanding its withdrawal. Many also opposed sending police abroad.

Kenya was facing severe external debt, forcing the government to raise taxes. Analysts said the Haiti deployment was part of a broader strategy to ease that debt burden and strengthen Kenya’s international standing.

Breaking the Cycle of Failed Foreign Interventions

By July 2024, the Kenyan mission had grown to about 500 officers. Its leaders said they wanted to break the historical cycle of foreign interventions in Haiti—missions often associated with human rights violations and, in the case of the UN’s MINUSTAH mission, the introduction of cholera in 2010.

Kenyan police officers enjoy their free time at their base in Clercine. Photo by MMAS, August 2024.

A senior mission official told AyiboPost that strict measures had been put in place to regulate the behavior of officers throughout their deployment. These included a ban on receiving personal visits and on any unauthorized contact with the outside world.

The First Casualties

In a statement issued on July 31, 2024, the mission reported that one officer had been shot in the shoulder during a patrol in downtown Port-au-Prince.

According to the release, the patrol had been ambushed by gangs attempting to hijack a shipment of rice near the National Port Authority. The attackers were repelled, and the wounded officer was evacuated for medical care.

On February 23, 2025, officer Samuel Tompoi Kaetuai was fatally shot during a joint operation with the Haitian police in Artibonite against the Gran Grif gang of Saviens.

He was airlifted to a hospital in the Dominican Republic but later died of his injuries. He was 31 years old.

Subsequently, the mission was reinforced by two additional Kenyan contingents, along with smaller units from El Salvador and Guatemala, bringing total personnel to nearly a thousand. Additional equipment also arrived to strengthen operations.

More Deaths and Injuries

In January 2025, gangs attacked the commune of Kenscoff. On March 18, during a clash in the Teleco area, a Kenyan officer was wounded—though not seriously, according to mission officials.

Days later, the MMAS suffered one of its worst losses: officer Benedict Kabiru Kuria went missing in Artibonite as three armored vehicles were set ablaze. Six months later, Kenyan media reported that Kuria’s family was still awaiting official confirmation of his death. After legal pressure, Kenyan authorities formally declared him dead in September 2025.

On August 31, 2025, a tragic accident on the road to Kenscoff involving two armored MMAS vehicles killed officer Kennedy Mutuku Nzuve, 41, along with two Haitian civilians—Roberto Jean and Mélius Saintélus—according to an AyiboPost investigation.

The mission’s official statement acknowledged only one Haitian civilian death. Eight other MMAS officers were injured, three seriously.

Roberto Jean’s mother told AyiboPost that she had reached out to both the MMAS and Haitian authorities seeking compensation, but without success. The grieving family had to take out loans to cover funeral costs. AyiboPost was unable to obtain comment from the mission.

Tensions with the Haitian Police

The first contacts between Kenyan forces and the Haitian National Police were marked by mistrust and frustration.

Interviews conducted by AyiboPost in September 2024 with officials from both sides revealed significant tension.

Haitian police officers accused the Kenyan mission of engaging in “propaganda,” while a Kenyan official claimed that some Haitian officers had ties to armed gangs.

Language barriers and pay disparities further strained relations.

A senior MMAS official told AyiboPost that talks were planned between the two forces to improve cooperation.

Internal tensions also plagued the mission.

In an April 2025 AyiboPost investigation, field officers complained that some colleagues refused to go into the field, claiming to be “specialists.”

According to multiple testimonies, field assignments were often influenced by personal connections.

“It all depends on who you know,” one officer said. “Some avoid operations but still receive preferential treatment.”

Kenyan police have also complained about the quality of the vehicles, which they consider unsuitable for combat, as well as the authorities’ lack of response to their concerns on this matter.

In an interview with AyiboPost, Jack Mbaka acknowledged that the armored vehicles frequently break down. “They shouldn’t be expected to be fully operational all the time,” he said.

President Ruto’s Visit to Haiti

While attending the 79th UN General Assembly, President William Ruto visited Haiti in September 2024, touring the MMAS base and meeting Haitian officials.

“Your success will be that of the National Police Service, the Haitian people, and all who believe in peace, stability, dignity, and democracy,” Ruto said, promising additional Kenyan reinforcements.

Political Instability and Logistical Challenges

In a November 2024 interview with AyiboPost, two senior mission officials admitted that political instability at the top of the Haitian state had hindered operations.

One explained that the premature replacement of Prime Minister Garry Conille had slowed progress on several initiatives.

They also cited unsuitable equipment and delays in troop deployment.

Maps shared with AyiboPost by a mission official traced patrol routes in the West and Artibonite departments—covering areas such as Pétion-Ville, Delmas, Christ-Roi, and Tabarre, as well as Petite Rivière, L’Estère, and Pont-Sondé.

AyiboPost could not independently verify this information.

Graphic showing the movement of Kenyan troops in Artibonite. Courtesy of MMAS, November 2025.

Between September and November 2024, the force was joined by 23 soldiers and two police officers from Jamaica, two from Belize, and half a dozen from the Bahamas.

Graphic showing the movement of Kenyan troops in the West. Courtesy of MMAS, November 2025.

A Kenyan officer told AyiboPost that some contingents refused to engage in combat. For instance, Bahamian troops preferred to remain with the coast guard in Port-au-Prince.

This, he said, increased the burden on the already under-equipped Kenyan officers.

The “Operational Phase” and Unfulfilled Promises

In November 2024, AyiboPost joined one of the mission’s nighttime patrols through several gang-controlled neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince.

During that patrol, commander Jack Mbacka told AyiboPost that his team would “neutralize at least one gang leader” by year’s end as the mission entered its “operational phase.”

He also acknowledged the persistent logistical difficulties.

To date, no major gang leader has been neutralized, and promises to reopen key roads remain unfulfilled.

To mark the new phase, the mission planned to establish about ten Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) across the country.

Bases were opened in lower Delmas, Pétion-Ville, and Pont-Sondé—shortly after a massacre there that killed dozens of civilians.

AyiboPost could not confirm the status of other planned bases.

Funding Shortfalls

The mission’s annual budget was set at $600 million, to be raised through voluntary contributions from UN member states.

In the end, only $113 million was collected from about ten countries—led by Canada ($60 million).

Limited Human Rights Incidents

According to human rights advocate Fritznel Pierre, who served on a commission monitoring MMAS conduct, no major human rights violations by mission personnel have been reported.

Pierre, who heads the human rights organization Combite pour la Paix et la Démocratie (CPD), said the only notable incident was the Pèlerin road accident.

An investigation, he added, is underway to determine the mission’s level of responsibility.

Pierre acknowledged the MMAS’s failure but noted that Kenyan officers had been deployed alongside the PNH in Artibonite and Kenscoff.

He expressed doubts about the newly announced FRG mission: “I already anticipate the same funding problems,” he told AyiboPost. “It’s nearly the same setup—still relying on voluntary contributions.”

Pierre added that current global geopolitical tensions will likely affect countries’ willingness to contribute.

Marie Yolène Gilles, of the Fondation Je Klere, said she expects nothing from the new force.

“In one year, the security situation has only worsened,” she said, pointing to blocked roads, expanding gang territories, and growing camps for displaced people. “Under these same conditions, the results will be identical.”

Reactions in Kenya and Haiti

In an interview with AyiboPost, Professor Ekuru Aukot, who has opposed the deployment since day one, said the mission’s presence in Haiti has damaged Kenya’s image abroad.

“For me,” he said, “this is a total failure for Ruto’s government—both here in Kenya and in Haiti.”

Efforts by AyiboPost to obtain comments from the Kenyan and Haitian governments were unsuccessful.

Two Haitian police officers who worked alongside the Kenyans said they recognized some dedication among the foreign troops but called the mission “a waste of time and money.”

Mathieuny Sidel, spokesperson for the national police union, was more direct: “This mission brought nothing to the PNH.”

A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis

Since 2024, Haiti has seen waves of massacres and attacks in Petite Rivière, Pont-Sondé, Fonds-Parisien, Solino, Nazon, Wharf Jérémie, Pernier, Mirebalais, Delmas 30 and 32, Delmas 19, Carrefour-Feuilles, Kenscoff, Arcahaie, Cabaret, Liancourt, and Marchand Dessalines, among others.

Major roads leading north and south remain under gang control, where armed groups impose tolls and extort travelers.

In January 2025, they also seized the last remaining open route to the southeast, through Kenscoff.

These attacks have killed dozens, displaced thousands, and destroyed entire neighborhoods.

An AyiboPost report published in July showed that people displaced by the violence are living in camps, traumatized and unable to afford medical or psychological care.

“I had hope,” said Georges Joseph, 52, his voice trembling. “I thought this force would really help us. But things only got worse.” He fled his home in Petite Rivière in April.

Gangs have also attacked police infrastructure.

The National Network for the Defense of Human Rights recorded at least ten gang assaults on police stations and patrols between June 2024 and June 2025, and more than twenty massacres and armed attacks in Artibonite since January 2025.

UN data shows that in the first six months of 2025, more than 3,000 people were killed, and the number of displaced persons surpassed 1.3 million.

According to AyiboPost’s tally, as of June 24, 2025, at least a dozen armored vehicles from both forces had been ambushed or destroyed by gangs.

In March 2025, the Haitian authorities announced the creation of a special task force under the Prime Minister’s office to counter repeated gang attacks. The unit has deployed explosive drones against armed groups—raising serious human rights concerns.

At least one drone strike reportedly caused civilian deaths in Simon-Pelé, a stronghold of gang leader Djouma, in September.

Ruto’s Speech at the United Nations

Addressing the UN General Assembly in September 2025, President William Ruto defended the MMAS record “despite financial constraints and the fact that less than 40 percent of its personnel were deployed.”

He claimed that the presidential palace—“once besieged by gangs”—had been restored as the seat of government.

In reality, the palace was never under gang control. The last official visit there occurred on October 9, 2025, when heavy gunfire disrupted a cabinet meeting.

By : Wethzer Piercin

Cover | Context: Journalists march against police brutality on January 28, 2021, in Port-au-Prince. Photo: Valerie Baeriswyl for AyiboPost